On 27 November 1945, one of the most flamboyant of those missions ended in failure with the resignation of General Patrick J. Hurley. His resignation, made publicly before a press conference, included claims of Soviet military connections with the Chinese Communists and accusations of personal betrayal by foreign service officers. American public opinion wanted the American troops, including more than several thousand Marines, brought home from the China theater. Attempts to verify Hurley's claims produced nothing. Under these uneasy circumstances, President Harry S. Truman appointed General George C. Marshall as his personal ambassador to China on 27 November 1945. Marshall arrived in China on 21 December. Throughout 1946, Marshall labored to achieve the essentials of a military cease-fire, a constitutional convention and coalition government, and a stabilization of the Chinese economy and political system. Despite Marshall's efforts, it was clear by the fall of 1946 that a permanent impasse had been reached between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalist government. Neither party seemed interested in Marshall's mediation, but only in the aid that was to accompany it. Marshall was recalled in January of 1947 to assume the post of secretary of state, a post at which he served until 1949, when he retired due to illness.
Historiographically, Marshall's mission to China was initially viewed as an unfortunate incident in an otherwise brilliant public career brought on by the overwhelming nature of China's problems and Soviet duplicity. It has been treated marginally in general evaluations of the post-World War II or mentioned only in passing by participants and observers alike. To date, a full-scale historical study of the mission has not been done. The revisionist trend of the 1960s and 1970s that looked at the broader context of the Cold War produced few works that provided an in-depth analysis of the mission.
One such work refuting the earlier image of the mission was made Relying heavily on the China White Paper3 and on secondary sources,
Tsou provided a multivariate analysis that focused specifically on the ambiguous nature of America's China policy throughout World War II and in the immediate postwar years. Tsou effectively put forth the thesis that American policy and actions in China had been unrealistic, not because of the scope of the problems, but because of the set of faulty assumptions upon which China policy was based. He argued that these assumptions did not take into consideration China's goals, capabilities, and potentialities.4 Tsou concluded that the policy which grew out of these unilateral assumptions was bankrupt because America never intended that its military forces would be used to intervene in China. Such a policy was doomed to failure because the United States not only lacked any real knowledge of China, but also the will and the ability to see that policy to its logical conclusion of direct military and unlimited economic intervention. In this analysis, the Marshall mission was presented as another in a series of ill-fated, quasi-diplomatic interventions designed to guide China to a political and economic stability sufficient to satisfy American policy goals In 1979, Michael Schaller presented another analysis of American wartime policy in China. He offered an interpretation of World War II that focused on America's drive to secure the Pacific perimeter against the Japanese. He presented images of unfulfilled expectations
